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Do Small Companies  
Have Superior Financial Expertise  
Or Are They Just Managing Earnings? 





This paper addresses the issue of the earnings distribution (explicitly net earnings, operating 
earnings and financing income) of Slovenian micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (now on 
SMEs). It builds on the work by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) on the earnings manipulation to 
avoid losses. We take their cross-sectional distribution of earnings approach as a baseline of our 
analysis, and apply it in an economic and financial crisis situation within the 2008-2010 period 
across various company size groups in Slovenia, a setting with extremely limited access to 
finance. However, since Durtschi and Easton (2005) claim Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997) 
approach per se do not necessarily prove earnings management, we additionally perform a non-
parametric Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test (Wilcoxon, 1945) on sub-samples of micro, 
small, medium-sized and large companies, controlled for their capital structure (indebtedness). 
The results of our analysis show a) earnings shifts occur in financial crisis also, b) earnings shifts 
occur more often among micro and small companies than medium sized and large companies, and 
c) despite of limited access to finance, rising funding costs and decreasing investment returns, 
micro and small companies making operating loss are recognizing statistically significant higher 
financing income compared to profit making micro and small companies and loss making medium 
sized and large companies.  
 





he question of earnings quality – not just in terms of measurement, but also in terms of their useful- 
and uselessness – has been at the forefront of academic interest for over 50 years. So far myriad 
proxies for earnings quality have been identified, including (but not limited to) measures based on 
earnings attributes, such as persistence, smoothness and timeliness. In this context, a stream of accounting literature 
is focused on earnings shifts motivated by small earnings increases and small loss avoidance (see e.g. Burgstahler & 
Dichev, 1997; Degeorge er al., 1999; Brown & Caylor, 2005; Burgstahler & Eames, 2006). Only few studies
1
 
consider earnings management in private companies, but are due to lack of data limited either on medium sized and 
large private companies only (e.g. Burgstahler et al., 2006; Coppens & Peek, 2005), on private companies whose 
financial statements are required by law to be audited (e.g. Van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen, 2008; Ball & Shivakumar, 
2005) or earnings shifts are tested on whole population, not by companies’ sizes (Garrod et al., 2007). Since micro 
and small companies are more often forced to adapt to external environment determinants (constraints), such as 
increasingly denied access to external financial resources in financial crisis, they are more motivated to earnings 
shifts not only for tax reasons (as documented by Garrod et el., 2008) but to appear financially sounder as they truly 
are, too.  
 
Addressing the issue of small loss avoidance of Slovenian micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (now 
on SMEs) this paper builds on the work by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) on earnings management to avoid small 
                                                 
1 For a detailed overview see Healy & Wahlen (1999), and Dechow et al. (2010). 
T 
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losses. Taking their cross-sectional distribution of earnings approach as a baseline our analysis makes two 
important contributions.  
 
First, we apply their distribution of earnings approach in a new economic setting, namely the 2008-2010 
economic and financial crisis.
2
 As Ball et al. (2008) find bank financing has a positive influence on earnings 
timeliness and Slovenia is a country dominated by debt market
3
, we believe precisely this environment in a crisis did 
not only affect firms’ capital structure and cost of capital, but worsened quality of earnings, too. Whereas Durtschi 
and Easton (2005) argue shapes of frequency distributions “cannot be used as ipso facto evidence of earnings 
management” (p. 558), we additionally perform a non-parametric Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test 
(Wilcoxon, 1945) on sub-samples of micro, small, medium-sized and large companies controlled for their capital 
structure in order to determine whether indebtedness impacts earnings shifts. 
 
Second, while most of studies exclude micro, small and medium sized enterprises (now on denoted as 
SMEs) from their analysis, our extension of Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997) approach tests precisely this enterprise 
population, since it represents a vast majority of the whole business population in almost any country (over 90 per 
cent in Slovenia), and we believe such an important segment of the population should not be discarded as irrelevant, 
which is a common practice in the accounting literature. In addition, there is many anecdotal evidence that SMEs are 
the prime victims of the so called “credit crunch”, especially in times of financial crisis (European Commission, 
2009), which further raises the question how limited access to finance and increasing financing costs affected 
earnings shifts in this segment of companies.  
 
2. BURGSTAHLER AND DICHEV’S DISTRIBUTION OF EARNINGS APPROACH 
 
Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997) distribution of earnings approach is based on Hayn (1995) findings that 
firms’ ability to report losses is limited as their shareholders hold a liquidation option. In this regard Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997) hypothesize (and find) that earnings (scaled by company’s market value) are managed to avoid 
earnings decreases by testing the statistical significance of distribution of earnings’ smoothness around zero.  
 
Although Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997) distribution of earnings approach is widely used as an evidence 
of earnings management due to its simplicity, this approach has proven to be very limited in providing solid 
evidence that kinks in earnings distribution represent true earnings manipulation (Dechow et al., 2010). In this 
regard Beaver et al. (2007) urge for caution “in interpreting a discontinuity in the earnings distribution as evidence 
of earnings management”, since some of the discontinuity can be attributable to true events, such as differential tax 
treatment, special items or presence of financial assets (Dechow et al., 2003). To determine whether discontinuity in 
the earnings distribution can be accredited to those reasons (and not true earnings management) we additionally 
perform a non-parametric Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test (Wilcoxon, 1945): by quartiles we test medians 
of companies’ income before income taxes (to exclude different tax positions of companies) and operating income 
(to control for financial assets and financial liabilities, also) whether they are the same. We apply this test on 
companies’ quartiles (from more to less indebted companies) across various company sizes, since – according to 
Garrod et el. (2008) and Sweeney (1994) – indebted firms tend to report higher earnings. 
 
3. SLOVENIAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND ACCESS TO FINANCE  
 
Following the German-based financial system the banking sector in Slovenia is the main financial vehicle 
for all companies: according to the Bank of Slovenia (2011) the banking sector had a 99.1 per cent share in the 
Slovenian financial market at the end of 2010 and total bank loans to the Slovenian business sector amounted to 38.9 
billion EUR or about 59.3 per cent of all bank loans to non-banking sector (Bank of Slovenia, 2010). Not 
surprisingly, the 2008 global financial crisis had a devastating impact on the Slovene banking and its lending to non-
financial institutions, which manifested itself in a severe downturn of loans to the private sector
4
. According to the 
Bank of Slovenia (2011) main reasons for decline in corporate loans were “high corporate indebtedness and the 
                                                 
2 Burgstahler and Dichev 's (1997) research is based on the 1976-1994 US data.  
3 Slovenian banking sector had a 99.1 per cent share in the Slovenian financial market at the end of 2010 (Bank of Slovenia, 
2011). 
4 See Bank of Slovenia (2011, Figure 16). 
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related low creditworthiness, the rising cost of loan collateral and the maintenance of high premiums over reference 
interest rates”. 
 
Given the dominance of the banking sector as the primary source of external funding and as a member of 
the Eurozone, which requires corporate financial statements according to IFRS or Slovenian accounting standards 
closely aligned with IFRS, Slovenia provides an ideal setting for the study of the impact of the 2008 financial and 
economic crisis on the earnings distribution. This especially applies since access to finance is the most problematic 
impediment to doing business in Slovenia according to various international studies (e.g. World Economic Forum, 
2011; World Bank, 2011). Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic’s (2008)5 even estimate the average Slovenian 
company’s share of external financing is merely 38.55 per cent (compared to e.g. Estonia: 60.14 per cent; Italy: 
77.71 per cent and Poland: 58.60 per cent). All these international benchmarks indicate a highly impaired access to 
financial resources in Slovenia, which could have profound implications for earnings quality of Slovenian 
companies.  
 
4.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1  Data source and sample 
 
Each Slovenian company, regardless of its size, has to file an annual financial statement to the Agency of 
the Republic of Slovenia for Public Legal Records and Related Services (AJPES), in order to meet the legal 
requirement of a public presentation of their business performance, as well as for tax and statistical purposes. As the 
nature of non-profit organizations and financial companies significantly differs from the rest of the companies, we 
excluded them from our analysis. Our sample, obtained from the AJPES, therefore consist of all non-financial, profit 
oriented companies registered in Slovenia to conduct business between 2008 and 2010. Due to earnings scaling 
insolvent companies (companies with negative equity) were omitted from our analyses, too.  
 
According to Table 1 almost all companies in Slovenia (99% per cent) are SMEs
6
. In the period 2008-2010 
the total number of companies increased by 7.2 per cent, but only due to rapid establishment of new micro 
companies. On the other hand, and in the light of the current financial and economic crisis, the number of medium-
sized and large companies decreased partly due to shrinking business volume (e.g. companies moved to lower size 
classes) or even bankruptcy (Mörec & Rašković, 2011). 
 
Table 1: Population of Slovenian companies breakdown for the 2008-2010 periods 
 2008 2009 2010 
Total AJPES population* 51,997 (100 per cent) 53,897 (100 per cent) 55,734 (100 per cent) 
Total micro companies** 40,764 (78.4 per cent) 41,501 (77.0 per cent) 42,710 (76.6 per cent) 
Total small companies ** 2,277 (4.4 per cent) 2,332 (4.3 per cent) 2,278 (4.1 per cent) 
Total medium-sized companies ** 731 (1.4 per cent) 746 (1.4 per cent) 736 (1.3 per cent) 
Total large companies** 750 (1.5 per cent) 738 (1.4 per cent) 689 (1.2 per cent) 
Source: AJPES (2011), and authors’ own calculations. Notes: *Non-financial enterprises, excluding single proprietors. ** 
Companies with positive equity value.  
 
4.2  Descriptive statistics 
 
Based on the breakdown of descriptive statistics across various company size groups in Table 2 the biggest 
decrease in EBIT (scaled by current period sales, since market value of SME companies is generally not available
7
) 
can be observed among micro companies. Similar observations can also be made for the decreases in net income 
across the four company size groups.  
                                                 
5 Data taken from the World Business Environment Survey (WBES); 80 per cent of respondent companies were SMEs. See 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic (2008) for more details.  
6 Classification is made according to Slovenian Companies Act and is as follows: micro companies (employees<10; revenues < 2 
mn EUR; assets< 2 mn EUR); small companies (employees < 50; revenues < 8.8 mn EUR; assets < 4.4 mn EUR); medium sized 
companies (employees < 250; revenues < 35 mn EUR; assets < 17.5 mn EUR); large companies (all other). 
7
 Scaled values by beginning of the period assets are available upon request from the authors.   
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Descriptive statistics also indicate that between sample (company sizes) and within sample heterogeneity is 
an important underlying feature of the data: the highest standard deviations have the sub sample of micro 
companies, followed by sub sample of large companies. Since sub sample of micro companies includes barely 
established companies as well as fully active enterprises, high variability is expected and it further draws attention to 
careful statistical treatment of the sample.    
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics by size of the company for selected scaled values  
of net earnings and operating earnings for the 2008-2010 periods 
Micro companies      
  Net earnings/sales      
Year N mean median sd min max 
2008 35,426 0.525 0.023 115.997 -2568.968 20992.881 
2009 35,855 -0.546 0.015 37.415 -5017.659 680.295 
2010 36,950 -0.152 0.016 18.402 -799.580 1922.706 
  Operating earnings/Sales      
Year N mean Median sd min max 
2008 35,426 -0.191 0.035 22.174 -1749.487 1788.657 
2009 35,855 -0.620 0.023 33.874 -3870.600 132.646 
2010 36,950 -0.395 0.023 9.863 -873.680 186.285 
Small companies      
  Net earnings/sales      
Year N mean median sd min max 
2008 2,277 0.019 0.018 0.548 -14.587 11.656 
2009 2,328 0.006 0.013 0.615 -24.345 12.443 
2010 2,277 -0.263 0.013 10.821 -508.253 13.389 
  Operating earnings/Sales      
Year N mean median sd min max 
2008 2,277 0.019 0.037 0.856 -21.199 13.131 
2009 2,328 0.004 0.027 0.826 -27.656 6.671 
2010 2,277 -0.026 0.027 2.241 -101.707 13.505 
Medium sized companies      
  Net earnings/sales      
Year N mean median sd min max 
2008 731 0.024 0.018 0.170 -3.324 1.744 
2009 746 0.002 0.011 0.233 -5.086 1.880 
2010 736 0.125 0.010 3.365 -6.770 90.970 
  Operating earnings/Sales      
Year N mean median sd min max 
2008 731 0.038 0.033 0.172 -3.454 1.500 
2009 746 0.005 0.024 0.298 -6.081 0.893 
2010 736 -0.080 0.023 2.679 -72.303 2.491 
Large companies      
  Net earnings/sales      
Year N mean median sd min max 
2008 692 2.999 0.023 318.147 -4607.930 4335.517 
2009 681 3.250 0.018 75.487 -349.905 1840.752 
2010 637 -6.873 0.017 179.079 -3276.901 1549.358 
  Operating earnings/Sales      
Year N mean median sd min max 
2008 692 -3.482 0.033 48.240 -1016.145 215.561 
2009 681 -0.756 0.030 12.380 -304.615 13.353 
2010 637 -7.866 0.028 116.245 -2766.130 8.995 
Source: AJPES (2011), and authors’ own calculations. Notes: Net earnings and operating earnings are scaled by current period 
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4.3  Methodology 
 
We use Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997) frequency distribution of scaled net earnings and scaled operating 
earnings. However, instead of their test statistic, we use alternative GRPV-statistics, proposed by Garrod, Ratej 
Pirkovič and Valentinčič (2006), GRPV statistics more robust in highly variable small sample settings as it doesn’t 
require a normal distribution assumption
8
. Consequently, this statistics is more suitable for testing our medium and 
large companies’ subsamples. If discontinuity at zero exists (GRPV gives statistically significant result), we assume 
earnings shifts exist. Since distribution smoothness is also dependent on bin’s width we determine interval’s width 
by Sturges’s rule and Freedman-Diaconis formula (Scott, 1992) to avoid artificial over- or under-smoothness 
(Hyndman, 1995).   
 
Since some of the discontinuity can be attributable to true events, so we apply non-parametric Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs signed-ranks test (Wilcoxon, 1945), additionally: by quartiles we test medians of companies’ income 
before income taxes (to exclude different tax positions of companies) and operating income (to control for financial 
assets and financial liabilities, also) whether they are the same. We apply this test on companies’ quartiles (from 
more to less indebted companies) across various company sizes, since – according to Garrod et el. (2008) and 
Sweeney (1994) – indebted firms tend to report higher earnings. 
 
5.  RESULTS 
 
Based on the descriptive statistics (Tables 1 and 2), we turn our attention to distribution of net earnings and 
operating earnings (both scaled by beginning of the period assets) across different company sizes over 2008-2010 
period. Figures 1 and 2 provide the results as follows. Figure 1 shows distribution of net income and operating 




As can be seen from the distribution of net earnings across time and over different companies size groups, 
discontinuity around zero exist across time and over different companies’ size groups. However, this is less the case 
in the distribution of operating earnings. Clearly, companies improve (in case of operating losses making 
companies) or deteriorate (in case of operating profit making companies) with their a) investment and financing 
activity and/or b) special items. In the setting of highly impaired access to finance and increasing financing costs the 
ability to improve earnings by investment/financing activity seem unlikely, especially since distributions show 
micro and small companies are equally inclined towards earnings shifts compared to medium sized and large 
companies which generally have more financial assets.  
 
In order to test whether loss making companies truly have superior financial expertise, we performed a non-
parametric Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test on sub-samples of micro, small, medium-sized and large 
companies across all three years (see Table 3). Looking at the results of Wilcoxon test, lowest quartile companies 
(operating loss making companies) by companies’ sizes, micro and small companies increase earnings by their 
investment/financing activity and special items (statistically significant higher number of income increasing than 
income decreasing companies). This activity is statistically significant even when we restrict the sample to 
companies with higher level of financial liabilities compared to financial assets (indebted companies). Given the 
current highly hampered setting, growing cost of finance, decreasing deposit interest rate and financial assets 
impairments these results are striking particularly in the light of medium sized and large companies. Namely, 
indebted large companies are not able to shift earnings upwards by financing income and/or special items. On the 
contrary, in 2010 financing income of indebted medium sized and large companies only worsened their operating 




                                                 
8 GRPV is binomially distributed. 
9 Scaling by current period sales gives consistent results. Results (including those for small and medium sized companies) are 
available upon request from the authors.   
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Figure 1: Distribution of net earnings and operating earnings from 2008-2010 for Slovenian micro companies 
Source: AJPES (2011), and authors’ own calculations. Notes: Net earnings and operating earnings are scaled by beginning of the period assets. Each column represents one 
period as follows (from left to right). 2008, 2009 and 2010.  The distribution interval widths are 0.005 and the location of zero on the horizontal axis is marked by the solid line. 
Only micro companies with positive equity value.   
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Figure 2: Distribution of net earnings and operating earnings from 2008-2010 for Slovenian large companies 
Source: AJPES (2011), and authors’ own calculations. Notes: Net earnings and operating earnings are scaled by beginning of the period assets. Each column represents one 
period as follows (from left to right). 2008, 2009 and 2010.  The distribution interval widths are 0.01 and the location of zero on the horizontal axis is marked by the solid line. 
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Table 3: Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test for operating earnings and earnings before taxes by size of the company for the 2008-2010 periods 
Source: AJPES (2011), and authors’ own calculations. Notes: earnings and operating earnings are scaled by beginning of the period assets. #Pos = number of positive shifts (income 
decreasing), #Neg = number of negative shifts (income increasing).Only companies with positive equity value. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Micro companies      
  All min-p25 p25-p50 p50-p75  p75-max  
Year #Pos #Neg z-test #Pos #Neg z-test #Pos #Neg z-test #Pos #Neg z-test 
2008 2,254 5,734 -39.0*** 4,055 3,504 12.2*** 5,984 2,647 46.2*** 4,767 3,782 23.9*** 
2009 2,640 5,790 -37.3*** 3,186 4,378 -13.5*** 6,087 2,817 44.2*** 4,679 4,159 17.5*** 
2010 2,721 5,777 -36.7*** 3,353 4,338 -11.1*** 6,187 2,908 44.8*** 4,815 4,185 19.4*** 
  Indebted              
2008 1,669 3,150 -19.6*** 3,255 2,100 23.8*** 4,982 1,504 51.2*** 3,546 1,980 33.0*** 
2009 2,047 3,430 -19.7*** 2,528 2,487 3.6*** 5,154 1,654 50.7*** 3,516 2,198 29.6*** 
2010 2,076 3,437 -20.4*** 2,615 2,511 4.1*** 5,136 1,669 50.8*** 3,512 2,286 27.9*** 
Small companies            
  All min-p25 p25-p50 p50-p75  p75-max  
Year #Pos #Neg z-test #Pos #Neg z-test #Pos #Neg z-test #Pos #Neg z-test 
2008 280 283 -2.1** 477 85 15.8*** 443 120 15.0*** 374 187 9.3*** 
2009 232 346 -4.9*** 427 152 11.7*** 450 130 14.3*** 347 231 5.9*** 
2010 262 305 -2.6*** 428 138 11.8*** 438 129 14.4*** 334 232 6.5*** 
  Indebted             
2008 246 181 1.3 436 52 16.2*** 416 64 16.6*** 310 84 12.3*** 
2009 216 253 -2.0** 394 99 13.2*** 414 67 16.0*** 294 98 10.4*** 
2010 234 217 0.1 385 75 14.1*** 395 71 15.8*** 282 113 10.0*** 
Medium sized companies            
  All min-p25 p25-p50 p50-p75  p75-max  
Year #Pos #Neg z-test #Pos #Neg z-test #Pos #Neg z-test #Pos #Neg z-test 
2008 79 103 -1.3 150 31 9.0*** 135 46 7.5*** 112 68 3.7*** 
2009 86 100 -1.0 133 52 6.4*** 141 45 7.8*** 93 92 2.4** 
2010 84 99 0.0 128 55 6.1*** 146 37 8.9*** 108 74 4.3*** 
  Indebted             
2008 69 62 1.0 137 16 9.5*** 126 21 8.5*** 96 28 6.3*** 
2009 80 66 1.6 125 28 7.4*** 129 21 9.3*** 82 47 5.4*** 
2010 81 55 2.8*** 118 31 7.6*** 134 19 9.7*** 86 34 5.9*** 
Large companies            
  All min-p25 p25-p50 p50-p75  p75-max  
Year #Pos #Neg z-test #Pos #Neg z-test #Pos #Neg z-test #Pos #Neg z-test 
2008 71 114 -4.0*** 108 76 1.4 145 40 7.8*** 118 66 4.6*** 
2009 75 108 -2.8*** 87 94 -0.8 139 44 6.6*** 111 72 3.0*** 
2010 83 87 -1.1 97 73 0.3 128 42 5.8*** 97 73 3.6*** 
  Indebted             
2008 46 31 1.0 81 17 6.5*** 123 13 9.0*** 88 21 6.4*** 
2009 53 47 0.6 55 19 5.0*** 113 14 8.3*** 76 25 4.9*** 
2010 53 28 2.2** 63 14 5.1 100 13 8.0*** 68 19 5.5*** 
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6.  METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
 
If companies intentionally manage earnings in some predetermined direction, this impacts distribution of 
earnings. However, distribution alone is not sufficient proof of earnings management, since company’s tax status, 
special items and presence of financial assets (Dechow et al., 2003) can shift earnings, too. Thus, this analysis gives 
no evidence that micro and small companies manage financial income on purpose. On the other hand, it also doesn’t 
provide any evidence that micro and small companies truly achieved superior financial income performance 
compared to medium sized and large companies. However, it demonstrates operating loss making micro and small 
companies are reporting statistically significant higher financing income compared to operating loss making medium 
and large companies.  
 
Burgstahler and Dichev’s (1997) earnings distribution approach is a useful and simple tool for rough 
estimation of events, related to earnings shifts, which are worthwhile to be studied by other analytical methods of 
earnings manipulation detection. By comparing distributions of different income statement items (net income, 
operating income, income before taxes, income before taxes and special items) and by employing different scaling 
technics (scaling by assets, sales, company’s market value) in the same setting (country or industry), interesting 
phenomena like superior financial performance of otherwise loss making micro and small companies in the extreme 




The purpose of this paper was to analyze the impact of financial crisis on distribution of earnings by 
various companies’ sizes in a setting with severely impaired access to financial resource. Burgstahler and Dichev’s 
(1997) cross-sectional distribution of earnings approach gives a fairly good insight also within the 2008-2010 crisis 
and shows statistically significant discontinuity of net earnings’ distribution around zero.  
 
Finally, more precise study of earnings distribution by various companies’ sizes shows that earnings shifts 
occur more often among micro and small companies than medium sized and large companies, and despite of limited 
access to finance, rising funding costs and decreasing investment returns, micro and small companies making 
operating loss are recognizing statistically significant higher financing income compared to profit making micro and 
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